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BOOK REVIEWS
itself represents previous evaluations of conduct and in turn
influences subsequent evaluations, provide a guide, for an ulti-
mate criterion is still lacking. But Professor Hall seems to have
faith in method, though the purpose of the method be left un-
explained. Arguing that the current political ideal has formed,
again at least since the time of the Stoics, a part of the essence
of positive law (in the sense that such ideal should conform to
"justice," "virtue" or "natural law"), and expressing the belief
that the democratic ideal, self-rule, is the highest political form
achievable by man, he concludes that self-rule must form a part
of the essence of law. Certainly the democratic form of govern-
ment would seem to be that most consistent with man's nature.
It also may be that self-rule is less likely to lead to excesses
like Nazism or Communism, which Professor Hall dreads as
much as any person. To that extent a plea for self-rule is more
than understandable. But if I understand Professor Hall cor-
rectly, he, does not actually separate the ethical quality of law
from its democratic or non-democratic formulation. In his analy-
sis, democratically formulated law has intrinsic value because
it is the product of the form of government best suited to ascer-
tain the "best answers" to human problems; that is, because there
is no better way of ascertaining the ethically valid, law estab-
lished by truly democratic processes must be "rationally the
most defensible," and therefore "objectively valid."
In the last analysis, Professor Hall's third component must
be regarded as another of those attempts, always necessarily
futile, to construct an ethical science without first principles.
It would be better if it were not necessary to be adversely critical
of the effort of so serious a scholar as Professor Hall. But there
is no way of judging the value of any activity as human activity
(that it, not merely in terms of immediate purpose), which is
necessarily the essence of ethics, unless the purpose of man can
be ascertained. This is the province of metaphysics and faith.
Those who can accept neither must be content to remain aimless
impulses to action without right to speak of values.
ROBERT A. PASCAL*
TAX PLANNING FOR ESTATES, by William J. Bowie. Nashville: The
Vanderbilt University Press, 1949. Pp. 93, $2.00.
My own liking for this little book is shown by the fact that
I placed it on the list of books for the students in the Estate
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and Gift Tax course here to buy under the GI bill. One of them
remarked that it was the sort of book that you could show to an
intelligent client to explain what you were trying to do for him.
It is a remarkably good job of explaining the essentials of a
complex subject in less than 100 pages.
There remains the question of the value of the book to the
practicing attorney in Louisiana. Because of the basic differ-
ences between the succession laws of this state and those of the
common law jurisdictions, there is a natural tendency to dis-
miss any national book on estate planning as inapplicable to the
problems which will arise here. While adjustments must of
course be made, dismissal of this volume would be a mistake.
Fundamentally, all estate tax avoidance devices are based
upon property theories of title which ignore economic realities.
If the property is not owned by the decedent at the time of
death, it is not part of the estate, and obviously not taxable.
However, there is a wide field in which property is not "owned"
by the decedent in any technical sense, but it is effectively con-
trolled (or was gotten rid of by a device which was a substitute
for a will)-and it is here that the battle between the taxpayer
and the tax collector has been waged. It has been a losing battle,
on the whole, for the taxpayers.1 Professor Bowe's book sum-
marizes the devices which still survive.
For Louisiana, the best of avoidance devices was already
available in the community property system, with its view that
one-half of the community property always had belonged to the
surviving spouse. This rule was applied to the tax cases by the
courts,2 but it was reversed by Congress in 1942, so far as the
estate tax was concerned. 3 The Supreme Court upheld Congress.
But the battle lost in Fernandez v. Weiner4 was won again in
Congress in 1948 so emphatically that not only was the recog-
nition of community property restored, but its benefits were
1. A losing battle, that is, in the courts. Taxpayers have fared better
before Congress. See Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (1937) 27-66; Paul,
Taxation for Prosperity (1947) 281. The most recent example is the con-
gressional reaction to the government victories in Commissioner v. Church's
Estate, 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322, 93 L.Ed. 310 (1949) and Spiegel's Estate
v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301, 93 LEd. 327 (1949), as expressed
in the Technical Changes Act, Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct.
25, 1949), discussed in Bittker, Church and Spiegel: The Legislative Sequel
(1950) 59 Yale L.J. 395. Most of the estate tax avoidance devices which are
effective today have specific congressional sanction.
2. Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.(2d) 542 (C.C.A. 10th, 1931).
3. Int. Rev. Code § 811(e)(2), repealed by Revenue Act of 1948, § 351(a),
62 Stat. 116.
4. 326 U.S. 340, 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 116 (1945).
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extended to all states through the marital deduction provisions.'
Thus the victory of community property, the civil law's con-
tribution to the field of tax avoidance, seems secure. The dis-
crimination in the present law is not against a majority of states,
but against the unmarried, a minority that may safely be ignored.
The two principal common law devices for the avoidance of
estate taxes are the irrevocable gift and the trust. The gift, of
course, has always been recognized by Louisiana law, but with
significant limitations not known to the common law.6 The trust,
in Louisiana, is a recent statutory innovation,7 and is subject
to limitations unknown in common law trusts.
In the use of the gift to avoid estate taxes, Louisiana lost
the first major battle in the courts because of a provision in the
Civil Code that gifts between spouses were always revocable.8
The legislature amended the code, 9 and today gifts between
spouses are as effective a device for the avoidance of an estate
tax in Louisiana as they are in any other state. Their practical
importance, however, is diminished by the present recognition
of community property and the marital deduction.
Making a valid gift, of course, does not lead to complete tax
exemption. There is then the gift tax to pay. As Professor Bowe
points out, however, because of the gift tax exemptions and
exclusions, and the appreciably lower gift tax rates, important
savings are possible through the making of inter vivos gifts,
despite the gift tax. There are, indeed, some savings even
though the gift is held to be in contemplation of death and the
estate tax is levied in the end.
Under the Civil Code' ° it is true that donations of more than
the disposable portion of the estate are not irrevocable, but sub-
ject to reduction. Further, it cannot be conclusively determined
whether a gift falls within these provisions until the honor's
death.' However, it is probable that these gifts are not "re-
vocable," and hence not taxable under the estate tax, under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The Federal statute
5. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e). The effect of the present law is explained
in Rubin and Champagne, Community Property Aspects of the 1948 Revenue
Act (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1.
6. Arts. 1467-1755, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. La. Act 81 of 1938 [La. R.S. (1950) §§ 9:1791-9:2212].
8. Art. 1749, La. Civil Code of 1870. Howard v. United States, 125 F.(2d)
986 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942), noted in (1942) 55 Rarv. L. Rev. 684; Vaccaro v.
United States, 149 F.(2d) 1014 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945).
9. La. Act 187 of 1942 [La. R.S. (1950) §§ 9:2351-9:2353].
10. Art. 1504, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Guidry v. Caire, 181 La. 895, 160 So. 622 (1935).
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refers to a power of revocation in the decedent either acting
alone or with others.12 The Louisiana Civil Code provisions indi-
cate that the power of reduction is not in the donor at all, since
the donation is made effective for his life, and the right to sue at
his death is given only to his forced heirs.13 The adaptability of
the suggestions with regard to gifts in Louisiana, consequently,
is limited to gifts of the disposable portion of the estate, or to
gifts in the proper proportion to the forced heirs. Otherwise
the gifts may be swept back into the estate in an action brought
by the forced heirs, thus raising the possibility of an estate tax
claim by the federal government. 4
The trust, however, is the greatest of the tax avoidance
devices. Most estate tax battles have been fought over it. Even
with the set-backs that taxpayers have suffered, the basic pat-
tern of a trust or bequest to the son for life, with remainder to
such of the grandchildren as the son shall designate, is effective
today to make the estate tax payable only every other genera-
tion instead of every generation.'5 Such a trust or bequest, how-
ever, is impossible in Louisiana. The duration of a Louisiana
trust is limited to ten years after the settlor's death, or to ten
12. Int. Rev. Code § 811(d) (1939).
13. Arts. 1503, 1504, La. Civil Code of 1870. Adopted as well as natural
children may be forced heirs. If, however, the donation is within the terms
of Art. 1497, La. Civil Code of 1870, making donations of all of the donor's
property void, the transaction is clearly taxable, since the power of revoca-
tion there is in the donor and within the words of the federal statute.
The right of revocation for ingratitude, given to the donor by Art. 1560,
La. Civil Code of 1870, is so limited in the situations where it can be invoked,
and in its effect under Art. 1562, La. Civil Code of 1870, that it is suggested
that it is not a "power of revocation" within the meaning of the Federal
Estate Tax. In the case of a collation, under Arts. 1227-1241, La. Civil
Code of 1870, since the moving party must be an heir rather than the donor,
It is suggested that the arguments in the text against taxability of a re-
duction are applicable.
14. Guidry v. Caire, 181 La. 895, 160 So. 622 (1935) is an example of an
action of this type. Whether such an estate tax claim would be valid is
a complex problem beyond the scope of this review. The additional danger
of tax claims as the result of the tacit revocation of donations inter vivos,
under the rule of Atkins v. Johnston, 213 La. 458, 35 So.(2d) (1948), is pointed
out in Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REvIsw 294.
15. This type of trust with a special power of appointment is specifically
exempted from taxation by Int. Rev. Code § 811(f) (2) (A). The power of
appointment is prohibited in Louisiana. Art. 1573, La. Civil Code of 1870.
If the grandchildren are alive at the time of the testator's death, much
the same result might be achieved by a bequest of the naked title to the
grandchildren, and the usufruct to the son, as permitted by, Art. 1522, La.
Civil Code of 1870. Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So.(2d) 234 (1945).
The tax result would be the same as in the common law trust, and the
theory upon which it is based is also the same-that title vests directly
in the grandchildren from the decedent. The bequest should be made to
the grandchildren by name, and the device is useful only where there is
no danger of disinheriting after-born grandchildren.
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years after child beneficiaries attain their majority. 16 Further,
the beneficiaries of a Louisiana trust must be in being at the
time it is established. 7 The trust for grandchildren not in esse
is an impossibility. Any tax avoidance device which depends
upon a trust for a lifetime's duration, or a trust for children
not in esse cannot be used in Louisiana.
Charitable trusts with indefinite duration are specifically per-
mitted in Louisiana by statute.' Taxes may be saved by using
part of the disposable portion of the estate to establish a chari-
table trust with future expenditures for charitable objects under
control of a trustee who may be a member of the family.' 9 The
more important device of retaining control of a family business,
by leaving the bulk of the estate to a charitable foundation con-
trolled by the family, and, through claiming the charitable de-
duction avoiding the sale of the business, perhaps at a sacrifice,
to meet the demand of the tax collector for cash, runs counter
to the doctrine of forced heirship. It could only be done here.
with the acquiescence of all of the forced heirs.
The charitable foundation as a method of preventing the
forced sale of a family business to satisfy the tax collector's
demand for cash has been the favorite method for preserving
the country's largest fortunes.20 As Professor Bowe points out,
however, it may also be useful in preserving a relatively small
business, and, while it sacrifices capital which would go to the
tax collector anyway, it preserves control.
16. La. R.S. (1950) § 9:1794.
17. La. R.S. (1950) § 9:1902. The same would be true of a direct gift,
under Art. 1482, La. Civil Code of 1870. Another important limitation on
Louisiana trusts, though not particularly significant for estate tax purposes,
is that while the legitime may be placed in trust (La. R.S. [1950] § 9:1793),
the income of the legitime must be paid to the beneficiary at least once a
year. The act is silent as to accumulations where the legitime is not in-
volved, and presumably they would be permitted.
18. La. R.S. (1950) § 9:2271-9:2295. In Louisiana, the trust for life with
remainder to charity, of the type involved in Henslee v. Union Planters
Nat. Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 69 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed. 239 (1949), and similar cases,
would probably be held to be invalid, as violating the ten year limitation,
rather than valid, as an exempt charitable trust. This is the view taken in
Wheeler, The Louisiana Law of Charities (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 177, 194.
The same result could be achieved by an outright bequest to the charity,
coupled with a contract by it to pay an annuity to the widow. The value
of the annuity, like the value of the life estate in the common law trust,
would be subject to estate tax, but the corpus would escape.
19. Pires v. Youree, 170 La. 986, 129 So. 552 (1930). But see Succession
of Purkert, 184 La. 792, 167 So. 444 (1936). In drafting such a trust, the
trustee should be named as such and it would be well to recite that the
powers are to be exercised under the Charitable Trusts Act.
20. Comment, (1950) 59 Yale L.J. 477. The exemption of charitble be-
quests is provided in Int. Rev. Code § 812(d) and of gifts in Int. Rev. Code
§ 1004(a)(2)(B).
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Most of the tax saving devices in Professor's Bowe's book
are not dependent upon the types of trust which are impossible
in Louisiana for their success. There is more than enough that
is of practical importance here to make the book well worth
reading. Where a gift in trust is recommended, in jurisdictions
where such a gift is possible, the same tax results can often
be achieved in Louisiana by an outright gift. Where a trust,
impossible in this state, is really needed, Louisiana lawyers
should not overlook the possibilities of setting up a trust in
another state. Assuming that movable property is involved, and
that it is moved to the state of the trustee's domicile before the
trust is set up by contract in that state, the law of that state
will govern the validity of the trust.21 It should be noted, how-
ever, that there is no constitutional obstacle to the taxation of
the trust by the state of the trustee's domicile, either in in-
heritance of property taxation 2 2 though most states where im-
portant trust business is transacted do not levy such taxes.
No one ought ever to write on this subject without making
this warning: There are many situations in which the best es-
tate plan, for the particular family, is not the one which saves
the most taxes. The estate tax avoidance devices which remain
effective generally require almost completely giving up control
over the property. There are many circumstances where it may
be worth the estate tax to retain complete control. Professor
Bowe begins his book with this warning, and it is appropriate
that this review should end by repeating it.
ALBERT H. COTTON*
21. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 294, and Louisiana Annota-
tions; Land, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws (1940) § 23; Hulin v. Faure,
15 La. Ann. 622 (1860).
22. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 67
S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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